The ancients attributed both the sorites paradox and the liar paradox to Eubulides, a member of the Megarian school and a contemporary of Aristotle. 1 Yet even though the two paradoxes have been known equally long, the liar has received far more attention than the sorites in philosophy and in logic, both historically and in our own time.2 The sorites, like Rodney Dangerfield, gets no respect-not much, anyway.
(Q) (1) (n)(Bn D Bn+1) (2) B(0) (3) B(107)
The associated conditional sorites is non-quantificational, and instead employs as premises a huge number of specific conditionals that all follow from the first premise of argument (Q) by universal instantiation:
(C) (1) B(O) (2) B(O) D B(1) (3) B(1) 3 B(2) (107+3) B(107)
An adequate account of vagueness must, of course, block both forms of sorites argument. Most recent treatments of vagueness in philosophy and in logical theory draw upon central notions in formal semantics, while also complicating these notions or attempting to generalize upon them.5 For instance, one approach involves the suggestion that truth and reference come in degrees, rather than being all-or-none notions. Typically this idea is implemented by introducing as truth values all real numbers in the interval from 0 (full-fledged falsity) to 1 (full-fledged truth); and perhaps also construing the numbers in this interval as measures of the degree to which a predicate applies to an object or sequence of objects (0 for full-fledged non-applicability, and 1 for full-fledged applicability). Under this approach, vague predicates do not sharply partition the world into those things that fall under them and those that do not; rather, there is gradual alteration in the degree to which they apply to things, and corresponding gradual alteration in the truth values of associated statements. Take the predicate abbreviated by 'B' in arguments (Q) and (C), for instance, and consider the sequence of statements B(O), B(1), ..., B(107).6 (I will call this the baldness sequence.) According to the degrees-of-truth view, there is no number i such that the i-th statement in this statement is true and the (i+l)-th statement is false. Rather, the truth values gradually move downward from 1 to 0, as the number of hairs increases. Thus, many of the premises in argument (C) have a truth value less than one; and so does the first premise in argument (Q). So neither argument is sound.
This approach faces a problem, involving awkward questions like these: Which statement in the sequence is the last whose truth value is 1? Which is the first whose truth value is 0? Prima facie, there just does not seem to be anything about the norms or standards for proper use of the predicate 'is bald' that would between the last statement in the sequence that is true and the first statement that is not, and to a sharp dividing point between the last statement that is not false and first that is. But the choice of any specific dividing points is just another form of arbitrary precisification; for, a crucial aspect of the robustness of genuine vagueness is that there is no precise fact of the matter about truth-value transitions in sorites sequences. 8 Other recent approaches that attempt to extend standard semantical treatments of formalized languages -e.g., by appealing to an iterative 'definitely'-operator somewhat analogous to the necessity and possibility operators of modal logic-evidently fare no better. In the end, they all seem committed to some kind of arbitrary precisification in the assignment of truth values to the statements in a sorites sequence, rather than capturing the fact that the distribution of truth values is itself an inherently vague matter. Wimpiness in these accounts is like water in a sealed balloon; squeeze it away at one spot, and it bulges forth somewhere else.
One response I sometimes hear to the charge of wimpiness is this: "Accounts of the kind being criticized are not intended to provide a full theoretical account of vagueness, but rather are simplified, idealized, theoretical accounts-comparable, for instance, to accounts in physics employing assumptions like frictionless surfaces or volumeless point-masses." But it takes only a moment's reflection to see the inadequacy of this reply. An assumption like the absence of friction simplifies one's theoretical account of a physical phenomenon without essentially distorting the phenomenon itself: the actual physical system behaves in a manner that would asymptotically approach the idealized limit-case, were the amount of actual friction to diminish. Furthermore, the same physical theories that apply to idealized systems typically are also applicable to more complex systems in which the idealizations no longer hold although dropping the idealizations sometimes complicates things in ways that are largely gratuitous for the explanatory or predictive purposes at hand. (One can accommodate friction in physics, when it becomes important to do so.) But the relation between the robustness of genuine vagueness, and the wimpiness attributed to vagueness under standard semantical treatments, is utterly different. For, it is essential to ordinary vagueness that there be no determinate fact of the matter about how the semantic status of the statements in a sorites sequence changes as one proceeds systematically from one end of the sequence to the other. I.e., genuine vagueness is essentially robust. Standard accounts flout this feature, and replace it with one or another kind of artificial precisification that is thoroughly incompatible with it.
Recognizing the robustness of vagueness, however, is only the beginning. The task now is to understand it-i.e., to come to grips with the notion "no determinate fact of the matter about semantic changes in a sorites sequence." This is anything but easy, as shall be seen.
The Logic of Vagueness.
In reflecting on what an adequate overall account of vagueness would have to be like, it is natural to begin by considering matters of logic. What logical principles should govern robustly vague language, and/or reasoning about robustly vague entities (assuming there are such entities)? In this section I address this question, albeit in a partial way. I describe some key features that look like plausible candidates for incorporation into a logic of vagueness.9
It is beyond doubt that the logic we seek must somehow differ from classical logic. For, this is a logical truth in classical logic:
Yet the left disjunct of (1), (2) (n)(BnDBn+l), is the major premise for the quantificational sorites argument (Q), whereas the right disjunct of (1), (3) (3n)(Bn & -Bn+l), asserts the existence of a sharp boundary between the bald and the not-bald. 10 Under classical logic, one of the disjuncts (and only one, since (2) and (3) are contradictories) must obtain. So classical logic has to go.
What we seek, then, is some modification of classical logic that both (i) blocks sorites arguments, and (ii) accommodates the robustness of vagueness. To begin with, the intuitively natural thing to say about statements (2) and (3) is that each of them is neither true nor false. Concerning (2), the intuitive reasoning to support this position goes as follows. Suppose that (2) is true. Then by argument (Q), a person with 107 hairs on his head is bald -which is clearly false. Hence, (1) is not true. Now suppose that (2) is false. Then its negation, (4) -(n)(Bn D Bn+1), is true. So, since (4) is logically equivalent to (3), there is a sharp boundary between the bald and the not-bald. But it's not the case that there is any sharp boundary. Hence, (2) is notfalse.
The same sort of reductio-style reasoning works for (3). If (3) is true then there is a sharp boundary between the bald and the not-bald; but it's not the case that there is any such boundary; so (3) is not true. If (3) false, then its negation, (5) -(3n)(Bn & -Bn+l), is true; so by the logical equivalence of (5) and (2) plus argument (Q), a person with 107 hairs on his head is bald-which is clearly false. So (3) is not false.
By analogous reasoning, (1) too is neither true nor false.
So we want statements like (1)-(3) to turn out neither true nor false. And, as illustrated by the preceding reasoning, we want reductio arguments to establish not that the reductio premise is false (and thus that its classical negation is true), but rather that it is not true.
The reasoning just articulated concerning (1)-(3) was metalinguistic, involving truth and falsity. But it is natural and useful to enrich the object language as well, by adding another form of negation. Let -0 be true when it's not the case that 4 is true; 4 itself might be false, or might lack truth value altogether. Call this weak negation. Strong negation, by contrast, will work in the manner of negation in classical logic: -4 will be true when 4 is false.
Although these two forms of negation do not seem to have cleanly distinguishable modes of expression in ordinary language, I do think they both occur in ordinary language. So I now stipulate the following usage, to apply henceforth in this paper: 'it's not the case that' is to be understood as the ordinary-language counterpart of -_, whereas other negation constructions in English will be counterparts of -. At the object-language level of discourse, then, the reductio reasoning articulated above establishes the weak negations of (2) and (3). And so, since the strong negation of (2) is equivalent to (3), and the strong negation of (3) is equivalent to (2), that reductio reasoning also establishes the weak negations of the strong negations of both (2) and (3). Thus the following are all true: (6) -,(n)(Bn z Bn+I) (I.e., it's not the case that for any n, if an n-haired person is bald then an (n+ 1)-haired person is bald.) (7) -,(3n)(Bn & -Bn+l).
(It's not the case that there's some n such that an n-haired person is bald but an (n+1)-haired person is not bald.) (8) -_,(n)(Bn z Bn+I).
(It's not the case that not every n is such that if an n-haired person is bald then an (n+ 1)-haired person is bald.) (9) -_(3n)(Bn & -Bn+1).l I (It's not the case that there's not an n such that an n-haired person is bald but an (n+1)-haired person is not bald.)
As for (1), since both disjuncts are neither true nor false, neither (1) nor its strong negation is true; and so the weak negations of both (1) This statement is no less potent than (2), as regards the sorites paradox. If we use it in place of (2) in an argument of form (Q), the resulting argument is valid too: The sort of semantics that one would want, for a language employing vague predicates and govemed by this sort of logic, would be one that not only assigns no truth value to certain statements-viz., statements like (1)-(5), (10), and (11) -but also assigns truth values to statements in a sorites sequence vaguely, rather than in any precise way.12 That, in turn, means that the semantical notions of truth and falsity will be robustly vague as well -and hence that the metalanguage in which the semantics is given will itself be subject to the same logic. And so forth, all the way up the metalinguistic hierarchy.
We can now address our four forms of the sorites argument, (Q), (Q2), (C), and (C2). Concerning (Q), the thing to say is that the key premise, viz., Exactly analogous things are to be said about argument (Q2), vis-a-vis its key premise (10).
With respect to argument (C), the natural-looking approach is to advert to the fact that truth is itself robustly vague on this picture (mirroring the robust vagueness in the object language), and thus that the truth predicate in the metalanguage is subject to just the same logic operative in the object language. So consider the all the conditional premises in (C), and consider the metalinguistic statements (12) Every premise of (C) is true and (13) Some premise of (C) is not true.
The logic of vagueness applies to these, in the metalanguage. So, by reductio reasoning we can argue that both (12) and (13) are both neither true nor false, and hence that (C) is not sound. And the same goes for argument (C2), with respect to the analogs of (12) and (13) In logical theory, treatments of semantics typically focus primarily on the task of giving a recursive truth characterization for a formal language. One standard way to do this is model-theoretically: define truth in a model, and then define truth simpliciter as truth in the intended model. Truth in a model, in turn, is the central notion used to characterize key logical properties and relations for statements of the language: logical truth, logical consistency, and the logicalconsequence relation.
The other standard approach, more directly in the spirit of Tarski, is to characterize truth homophonically -or at any rate, quasi-homophonically (as I'll put it). A literal homophonic truth characterization employs a metalanguage that is a direct extension of the object language, minimally enriched with key semantical vocabulary-notably a satisfaction predicate. 13 The base clauses do not advert to the extensions of primitive terms (as in the model-theoretic approach). Rather, they use the terminology whose semantics they are specifying, as in this schema for monadic predicates:
For any object o, o satisfies 'F' iff Fo.14
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A quasi-homophonic truth characterization is much like a fully homophonic one, except that the operative metalanguage is a modestly richer extension of the object language. In the typical case, the metalanguage is a fragment of natural language, whereas the object language is a formal language; the metalanguage uses ordinary-language logical vocabulary: 'and', 'or', 'every', 'some', etc.
Prima facie, the model theoretic approach to semantics is inherently illsuited for dealing with the logic of vagueness. For, models are certain kinds of sets; and sets, as noted already, are paragons of precision. The homophonic approach, on the other hand, does not face this problem. Moreover, prima facie one would expect it to do what needs doing, if the robustness of vagueness is to be accommodated: viz., to assign semantic values to sentences of the object language in a genuinely vague-i.e., robustly vague-way.
On the other hand, as Grandy (1986) points out, an adequate homophonic truth characterization can leave undetermined certain key logical properties and relations, even though those properties and relations are derivable, within the operative metalanguage, from the truth characterization. For, the derivation can depend crucially on the logic of the metalanguage itself, and the same truth characterization, with all the same "target biconditionals" of the form [T(' 4') <-4] still derivable from it, might be formulable in a metalanguage governed by a different logic. Grandy writes:
It has been claimed that.. .we learn about the logical forms of sentences by giving a [homophonic] truth theory for the language... . It certainly appears that...we learn from the truth theory more than the biconditionals-for example we can easily derive within standard truth theories that any specific instance of excluded middle is true; indeed we can derive that they are all true. Surely this information is about logical form.
But how much of it comes from the truth theory? We can divide the derivation of the sentence T('A v -A') into two parts, the first consisting of a derivation of a biconditional with that on the left and A v -A on the right, the second consisting of a derivation of A v -A followed by the result desired. The truth theory enters only into the first portion. To put the point more strongly, one can give a perfectly adequate truth definition of a classical language using an intuitionistic metalanguage, and in that case the result about excluded middle is clearly not forthcoming. (Grandy 1986, p. 181) Given (i) Grandy's observation that a homophonic truth characterization can underdetermine the logical properties and relations of sentences of the language, and (ii) the observation in Section 2 that the metalanguage too will be subject to the non-classical logic of vagueness (since truth itself is robustly vague), one should approach the project of giving such a truth characterization with suitably modest expectations. The truth characterization is not likely to settle questions about logical properties or relations, independently of the logic operative in the metalanguage. The appropriately modest expectation, rather, is this: if the logic of the metalanguage has the characteristics described in Section 2, then the truth characterization will interact with this metalinguistic logic to yield the desired non-classical logical features for object-language sentences.
170/Terence Horgan
With this pared-down prior expectation in force, let me now set forth a quasi-homophonic truth characterization for a first-order language employing robustly vague predicates. Here is a very simple language of this kind:
Open formulas:
( 
MT T('O') X (F) F('O') -X4 (N) [-T('O') & -F('O')] " (--i & _0
Assuming that the metalanguage is itself governed by the logic of vagueness sketched in Section 2, a truth characterization along these lines should underwrite the appropriate semantic status for sorites-involving statements (2), (3), (10), and (11). In our metalanguage, however, neither this latter statement nor its strong negation obtain. What holds in the metalanguage, rather, are its weak negation and also the weak negation of its strong negation:
(18) It's not the case that for every number n, either it's not the case that a person with n hairs on his head is bald, or a person with n+1 hairs on his head is bald. (19) It's not the case that not for every number n, either it's not the case that a person with n hairs on his head is bald, or a person with n+1 hairs on his head is bald.
And so, by the conjunction of (18) and (19) plus the appropriate instance of schema (N), statement (10) turns out to be neither true nor false.16 But although things apparently do work out as wanted regarding the semantic status of statements like (2), (3), (10), and (11), it is clear that -just as expected-the outcome is not a product of the truth characterization by itself, but rather a joint product of the truth characterization and the logic operative in the metalanguage. This point can be made vivid by considering how things turn out if we make different assumptions about the nature of the metalanguage.
Suppose, for instance, that the metalanguage is governed by classical logic. Then the two object-language negation symbols will, in effect, collapse into one another: they will be equivalent. (The connectives 'D' and '-x' will collapse into one another too, as will '-' and '-'.) For any open formula 4 and any object o, o will either satisfy or dissatisfy 4, and hence will either satisfy or dissatisfy '-.
For any sentence 4, either 4 or -4 will be true. Both sides of the '-' in schema (N) will be false for each sentence 4. As for sorites-related statements, either (2) or (3) will be true; likewise, either (10) or (11) will be true.
Or suppose instead that the metalanguage is governed by some wimpy nonclassical logic-say, the kind that results from standard supervaluationist model-theoretic semantics. Then although some predicates, including perhaps our predicate 'B', might be such that certain objects neither satisfy nor dissatisfy them, still there will be two precise boundaries, in sorites sequences of this kind: a boundary between the true statements and the ones lacking truth value, and another boundary between the latter and the false statements. Thus, if the baldness sequence has members that are neither true nor false, then although statements (2) and (3) will each tum out neither true nor false, (10) will turn out false and (11) will turn out true.
So although our homophonic truth characterization evidently works properly under suitable assumptions about the logic of the metalanguage, it works differendly under different such assumptions. Given this outcome, and given the unpromisingness of model-theoretic semantics, it appears that one important implication of the robustness of vagueness is the need for some new kind of semantical theory, different from the model-theoretic kind and broader than a homophonic truth characterization. An especially salient task for such a semantics would be to give some suitable, non-model-theoretic, account of key logical properties and relations: logical truth, logical consistency, and the logical consequence relation. What such a semantical theory might look like is a question I will leave largely open, although my subsequent remarks (especially in Section 6) will have some bearing on the matter.
Of course, since there is currently no such semantical theory to underwrite the logic of robust vagueness, and since it is quite unclear even what sort of theory to look for, the worry also arises that perhaps no such theory is possible-that perhaps genuine, thoroughly robust, vagueness is ultimately incoherent, and hence impossible. And in fact the problem of incoherence gets dramatically forced upon us by a version of the sorites paradox against which the nonclassical logic I have presented seems impotent, a version which seems to establish both the impossibility of vagueness and the underlying incoherence of this logic itself. I turn next to that.
Thesis: Vagueness is Impossible.
I now commence the three-part dialectical investigation I described in the introduction. In this section I take on the role of advocate for the Thesis-the contention that vagueness is impossible. I base this contention on a form of the sorites paradox I will call the forced-march sorites-so named because it is designed to force us, one step at a time, into a separate verdict on each successive pair of adjacent items in a sorites sequence. The reasoning proceeds as a linked sequence of subarguments. Given that genuine vagueness, if there could be such a thing, would be robust, forced-march sorites reasoning establishes that genuine vagueness is impossible. And the sort of non-standard logic that seems required to block such reasoning turns out, on reflection, to be incoherent.
Antithesis: Vagueness is Actual (and Hence Possible).
If indeed vagueness is impossible, then of course it is nonexistent: there are no vague objects or vague properties in the world; no vague concepts employed in human thought; and no vague terms in human language. This means, in turn, that wherever we ordinarily think there is vagueness, there must actually be certain hidden facts, to which we have little or no epistemic access, in virtue of which there is really complete, utter, precision.19
In this Section I will argue that there are no such hidden facts, and that vagueness is therefore actual (hence possible). I will maintain not that the putative existence of such facts is incoherent, but rather that the empirical evidence against them is enormously strong. The empirical case involves three interrelated, mutually supporting, considerations.
First is the content of our semantic intuitions, as competent language users, about matters of vagueness and precision. For instance, take the term 'tall', as applied relative to some specific reference class of humans (say, Caucasian males). When we consult semantic intuition, it seems obvious there is no single precise minimum value n such that a Caucasian male who is n millimeters in height is tall. It seems obvious that nothing about the world in itself, or about our concept of tallness, or about the semantics of the term 'tall', uniquely sanctions any specific value n, over against numerous others-and hence that any such choice would be utterly arbitrary.
These semantic intuitions, especially since they are so persistent and so universal, provide strong empirical evidence that there is no precise, nonarbitrary, minimum height for tallness. Semantic intuitions of competent speakers constitute an important form of empirical data, vis-a-vis hypotheses and theories about the workings of human concepts and the semantics of our terms. (The evidential role of such intuitions is quite analogous to the role of competent speakers' intuitions about grammaticality and syntactic ambiguity, vis-a-vis empirical hypotheses and theories about natural-language syntax.) The empirical evidence they provide is of course defeasible: semantic intuitions, like other intuitions, can be mistaken. Nevertheless, there is an epistemic presumption in their favor, particularly when the intuitions are both persistent and universal; for, under those conditions especially, they probably emanate from speakers' semantic competence as language users and their cognitive competence as concept users, and hence are probably correct.
The second consideration telling against precise boundaries for seemingly vague notions like tallness is that we currently cannot even begin to conceive or imagine-not even in a very sketchy way-what kinds of putative hidden facts could do the job required of them: viz., to combine with more familiar facts to generate a precise, non-arbitrary, boundary. That we cannot even conceive what such hidden facts could be like is itself substantial evidence that they don't exist. Once again, it is indeed empirical evidence, and hence defeasible; for, what we cannot now conceive might be actual, and hence metaphysically possible, anyway. (Before Einstein, who could conceive of the relativity of simultaneity, or of curved spacetime?) But unless and until some positive account emerges, our present inability to form any positive conception of hidden precisificationfacts strongly warrants concluding that there aren't any. 20 Third, when one looks to contemporary science-physics and/or any of the special sciences -one evidently finds nothing there that lends any theoretical support to the hypothesis that seemingly-vague notions like tallness really have perfectly precise boundaries. Quite the contrary: given the broad outlines of contemporary physics, it would appear that even a complete physics-level characterization of the world would fail to provide any non-arbitrary way to precisely delimit the extension of terms like 'tall'; and nothing one can point to in the special sciences suggests that facts specifiable in special-science vocabulary could play this role either.21 As far as one can tell, our best empirical theories of the world just do not posit hidden facts that determine precise boundaries where there is apparent vagueness.
The considerations just mentioned, all epistemically potent in their own right, strongly reinforce each other as well. Together they add up to a tremendously strong empirical case against the existence of hidden, boundaryprecisifying, facts-and thereby in favor of the reality of vagueness.
In response to this argument, the stubborn denier of vagueness might try a fallback position. On the one hand he continues to insist that there is no genuine vagueness: real, robust, vagueness is impossible. On the other hand he admits that the argument against hidden boundary-precisifying facts has some force and so he opts for some wimpy logico-semantic treatment -the degrees-of-truth approach or supervaluationism-of notions we ordinarily regard as vague. Unlike the original propounders of these treatments, he would not be claiming to give an account of vagueness itself. Rather, he would be claiming that the terms and concepts we normally consider vague are not really vague at all (since genuine, robust, vagueness is impossible), but are actually only wimpily pseudo-vague. This proposal, he maintains, preserves logical coherence for these terms and concepts; and positing wimpy pseudo-vagueness allows us to avoid any commitment to a sharp line of demarcation between, e.g., those persons who are bald and those who are not bald, or between those Caucasian males who are tall and those who are not tall, etc.
But a moment's reflection reveals that this fallback reply is not tenable. The problem is that even wimpy pseudo-vagueness would require the kinds of hidden precisification-facts I have just argued against. Relative to the baldness sequence, for instance, certain hidden facts would have to combine with ordinary facts to determine a unique natural number n such that Bn is true but Bn+1 is not true; and a unique natural number m such that Bm is not false but Bm+1 is false. The argument against hidden line-drawing facts extends to this kind too, no less than to the kind that would preserve classical logic.22
Given (i) our semantic intuitions about matters of vagueness, (ii) our present inability to conceive what hidden precisification-facts could be like, and (iii) the fact that current science evidently does not posit any such facts or enlighten us about how there could be any, the empirical case against the existence of these putative facts is overwhelming. This negative case also extends to any fallback anti-vagueness position invoking degrees of truth, supervaluationism, or other comparably wimpy logico-semantical approaches.
Synthesis.
Initially it seems that the Thesis and the Antithesis are exclusive and exhaustive, so that one or the other must be right. If so, then perhaps we finally have no choice but to acknowledge that the aprioristic argument for the Thesis trumps the empirical argument for the Antithesis, and to insist that there simply must be hidden precisification facts wherever we ordinarily think there is vagueness. Given the strength of each argument, however, we have reason to seek out a position that largely accommodates them both, and that somehow avoids fully accepting or fully rejecting either the Thesis or the Antithesis. In this section I will propose such a position.
When caught philosophically between a rock and a hard place, the appropriate initial strategy is to make a distinction. In this case, the distinction we want is between two potential kinds of vagueness. On the one hand is vagueness in certain objects, properties, or other entities in the mindindependent, discourse-independent, world. (Henceforth, in order to emphasize that I mean the world in itself, independently of how we happen to think about it or talk about it, I will employ Hilary Putnam's capitalization convention. On the one hand, then, is vagueness in THE WORLD, and in certain OBJECTS, and/or PROPERTIES, and or other ENTITIES.) On the other hand is vagueness in human thought, and/or in human language.
A preliminary formulation of the Synthesis I want to propose, over against both the Thesis and the Antithesis, is this:
Vagueness in THE WORLD is impossible, but vagueness in thought and in language is actual (and hence possible).
But there needs to be more to the Synthesis than this, because the argument in Section 4 was that vagueness is impossible simpliciter-not just that it is impossible in THE WORLD. As we saw, the attempt to block that argument by resorting to the non-classical logic of Section 2 is ultimately logically incoherent. THE WORLD, of course, cannot be logically incoherent (although it could certainly turn out to be incomprehensible). Thought and language, on the other hand, can be logically incoherent, without thereby being meaningless. So the Synthesis should assert that vagueness in thought and language is both actual and incoherent. Thus the official Synthesis is this:
Vagueness in THE WORLD is impossible; vagueness in thought and in language is incoherent, and yet is actual (and hence possible) anyway.
I will devote the remainder of this section to an exposition and defense of the Synthesis position regarding vagueness in thought and in language. (I will briefly return to vagueness and THE WORLD in Section 7.) Even though vagueness is logically incoherent, it does not follow that vague concepts or vague terms are impossible. Rather, as long as the incoherence somehow remains well insulated, instead of propagating itself destructively through our thought and discourse, there is no reason why it cannot be present there-dormant, so to speak. (For purposes of this paper I can leave it open how best to cash the general notion of logical incoherence, and also the more specific notion of insulated logical incoherence. Roughly, a concept is logically incoherent if someone who employs it correctly thereby becomes committed, at least implicitly, to accepting statements that jointly entail a contradiction. The incoherence is insulated if there are features of thought and language that systematically prevent the commitment from surfacing explicitly.) Logical incoherence is usually quite a bad thing, of course, because its effects are typically so virulent. But one should not infer that it is always harmful or debilitating.23 In fact, here is an argument to the contrary, with respect to the kind of incoherence manifested by vagueness (henceforth, vincoherence). Vagueness is actual, and is often a highly useful and desirable attribute of human concepts and terms. To a large extent, its utility stems from its robustness. But robustness is also the source of v-incoherence. Therefore, vincoherence is not a bad thing; although most kinds of logical incoherence are fatally malignant in their effects on thought and discourse, v-incoherence is benign.
What logico-conceptual mechanisms operate to insulate v-incoherence, keeping it dormant and preventing it from generating destructive effects? Part of the answer, I take it, is that human categorization schemes evolve pragmatically, in such a way that frequently-encountered objects, events, and situations tend to wind up partitioned rather cleanly within our operative categories, rather than winding up within the penumbral periphery where vagueness starts to matter. As long as the partitioning goes cleanly, vagueness does not intrude and we can simply rely on classical logic.24
But the insulatory mechanisms need to be more resilient than this, because penumbral cases do arise occasionally, both in ordinary life and in theoretical inquiry. (They arise all the time in philosophical inquiry.) In such cases, it seems plausible to suppose, we employ (often tacitly) the sort of logic I sketched in Section 2. Two complementary factors are involved in this. First we reject, via weak negation, statements like the following, associated with the three kinds of sorites arguments considered earlier (viz., quantificational, conditional, and forced-march versions): We also reject, via weak negation, the strong negations of such statements, since these are logically equivalent to statements asserting the existence of sharp boundaries between vague categories. Second, we steadfastly refuse to take a stand on each separate pair of adjacent items in a sorites sequence; i.e., we refuse to be subjected to forced-march querying about these individual pairs. If pressed, we merely say "There's no fact of the matter about category-transitions," and we refuse to be pressed further. Now, as I argued in Section 4, this refusal reveals that the logic described in Section 2 is itself incoherent, at bottom. For, we can provide no cogent rationale for denying (either strongly or weakly), of any particular pair of adjacent items in a sorites sequence, that a query about the comparative status of those two items has a correct answer; yet once we acknowledge this, the nascent incoherence of our non-standard logic quickly comes to the surface. But if the real point of the logic of vagueness is not to eschew incoherence but merely to insulate it, then this nascent incoherence will not be a problem-provided that it remains nascent. And it is easy enough to keep it that way: one just stubbornly maintains one's refusal to answer those persistent queries about adjacent pairs in the sorites sequence. One asserts oneself, and refuses to be intellectually cajoled into the forced march. Praxis trumps theoria.
As we saw in Section 3, a Tarski-style truth characterization can be given for an object language governed by the logic described in Section 2; and if the metalanguage is governed by that logic too, then object-language statements like (2), (10), (16), (17), (20), and (21) all turn out neither true nor false, as desired. These results about semantics further underscore the fact that the non-standard logic of vagueness can be employed in a way that effectively insulates its own underlying incoherence, thereby insulating v-incoherence as well.
To summarize: The argument in Section 4 shows that vagueness in THE WORLD is impossible. This argument cannot be deflected by appeal to the nonclassical logic of Section 2, because (as was also shown in Section 4) vagueness and its logic are, at bottom, incoherent. With respect to thought and language, however, incoherence does not entail impossibility. So, given (i) the argument in Section 5 that vagueness is actual, and (ii) the fact that v-incoherence can be insulated so effectively as to be benign rather than malignant, vagueness in thought and language is both incoherent and actual. Third is another point about semantics, in light of this conclusion about metaphysics. A credible overall semantical theory, I take it, ought to allow for the genuine truth of statements of the kind we ordinarily regard as obviously and nonproblematically true. So, since such statements quite typically talk about vague objects like mountains, desks, and people, and since they quite typically predicate vague properties like tallness and baldness, a credible overall semantical theory should not construe the notion of truth as involving simple, direct, language/world connections between (i) the referential and predicative apparatus of our discourse, and (ii) OBJECTS and PROPERTIES. Rather, it should instead treat truth as involving a mode (perhaps various modes, in various contexts) of "correspondence" between language and THE WORLD that is considerably more subtle, and considerably less direct.29 Finally, and related to the last two points, is an observation about the metaphysics of semantics. As I argued in Section 2, where vagueness is involved in object-level discourse, truth itself is vague too; its vagueness mirrors the vagueness in the object language. So, since there are no vague PROPERTIES according to the Synthesis, there is no such PROPERTY as TRUTH either.30
These implications are among the reasons why I said in the introduction that the sorites paradox is much more fraught with import for metaphysics, semantics, and logic than is generally appreciated. With respect to the semantics and logic of vagueness, none of the standard approaches to the sorites work or are even in the ballpark of working; we evidently need a new kind of logical semantics, and at present nobody really knows what it should be like. And with respect to metaphysics, the sorites has very radical, yet seemingly unavoidable, ontological consequences. So let me end by reiterating, specifically with respect to the sorites paradox, the words of Quine: "Of all the ways of paradoxes, perhaps the quaintest is their capacity on occasion to turn out to be so very much less frivolous than they look."'31,32 Sanford (1975 Sanford ( , 1976 413-14) . 12. There might also turn out to be certain statements in the baldness sequence that lack truth value, under this vague truth-value assignment. But there needn't be. The crucial thing is that there be a robustly vague transition, from one semantic status to another, as one progresses along the baldness sequence. It matters little whether three semantic statuses are involved for the individual statements in the baldness sequence-true, false, and neither, with two robustly vague transitions-or whether, instead, there is only one robustly vague transition, directly from truth to falsity, without there being any statements in the baldness sequence that get assigned the semantic status "neither true nor false." 13. I use the phrase 'truth characterization', rather than the more common 'truth theory', because I doubt whether a homophonic or quasi-homophonic truth characterization necessarily deserves the honorific label 'theory'. Some grounds for doubting this will emerge in the course of this section. 14. I am here using the term 'homophonic', as is commonly done, for truth characterizations of the kind that Grandy (1986) calls "homophonic and homomorphic." Heteromorphic ones he describes this way:
[I]n heteromorphic truth theories the goal is not to preserve the superficial form of the L sentence but to reveal its true underlying logical form.... In its usual setting, Russell's analysis of definite descriptions provides a means to define truth for a first-order language in a metalanguage without definite descriptions. Horgan (1986a Horgan ( , 1986b Horgan ( , 1990 Horgan ( , 1991 
